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THE PROXY CONTEST as a means of instituting corporate reform has become 
popular in the United States since World War 11. Up to now, however, there 
have been no systematic investigations of the causes of proxy contests, because 
scholars, journalists, and lawyers have thought each contest so unique that any 
attempt at aggregation of the results of the individual contests has been con- 
sidered to be fruitless. The results of this analysis of sixty-seven companies, in 
which there were seventy-nine contests, proved otherwise. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to uncover the causal forces that pre- 
cipitate a proxy contest, and then to aggregate them to determine whether a 
causal classification system was possible. Such a system would be invaluable to 
managements in aiding them in the avoidance of future proxy contests, since 
corporate vulnerabilities which could lead to a contest would be recognized and 
eliminated. 
The term “causes” is used to mean the events and conditions that ultimately 
lead to proxy contests. In  analyzing the contests, the causes were discovered 
to be either precipitating or facilitating in nature: precipitating causes are 
events and conditions that arouse opposition to management, whereas facilitat- 
ing causes are conditions that promote efforts of the opposition to gain represen- 
tation and/or control. The methodology developed for this study revealed 
furthermore that there were two types of causal forces: financial and mn- 
financial. Financial causes are all those relating to the company’s financial 
condition and profitability. Non-financial causes, on the other hand, reflect the 
personal relationships and activities of the management and opposition, and 
the environmental atmosphere surrounding the firm. Utilization of the methodol- 
ogy in every case led to a determination of the cause or causes which pre- 
cipitated the contest. 
After the cause(s) of each company’s contest was determined, the results 
were aggregated into a causal classification system which evolved from the 
micro-analysis. Unlike previous studies, this study was able to evolve such a 
cIassification system. The presence of this causal classification system invali- 
dated the contention that causal patterns are impossible to delineate in proxy 
contests. Hmever, it is evident also that a single causal pattern which explains 
all proxy contests does not emerge from the research. 
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This analysis revealed that almost one-half of the contests were caused by 
operating performancemost frequently general inefficiency and stagnant, 
unprogressive, operations. In addition to poor operating performance, other 
important financial causes were: specific management decisions, conflicts arising 
from differences in the appraisal of the value of alternative uses of the com- 
pany’s resources, power struggles arising from intra-board and management 
conflicts over corporate policy, power vacuums, and the most startling result 
of the entire analysis-the high incidence of management dishonesty, fraud, 
and illegal financial activities. The non-financial causes precipitated most of the 
other contests, the major causes being conflicts and dissensions among and 
between the board of directors and the management. Furthermore, one corpo- 
rate structural characteristic, cumulative voting, facilitated the conflict in 
fifteen separate instances, more than any other cause of conflict. 
The investigation disclosed that external influences and pressures did not 
cause proxy contests. The causal forces initiating the contests are explained by 
internal activities and conflicts within the company itself and not by external 
influences and pressures. Since the contests are internally caused, managements, 
in order to avoid such contests, must eliminate the internal vulnerabilities. The 
mere fact that a contest occurs places blame on the company and its incumbent 
management. Thus all of the basic corporate vulnerabilities are traceable to 
the management and its inability to perform in such a manner so as to avoid 
conflict. 
One of the most significant conclusions of the analysis was that the high 
incidence of non-financially caused contests limits the usefulness of the causal 
classification system developed in applications for future analysis. Although 
there was overlap in cases where the causes were partly financial in origin, 
the non-financially caused contests are unique and are, therefore, devoid of 
generalization. 
Following the main body of the analysis is an extensive appendix which 
contains the pertinent data utilized in determining the causes of the proxy 
contests. This material, combined with the methodology provided in the text, 
provides the reader with the causal forces for every contest. 
